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Abstract The expansion of regionalism has spawned an extensive theoretical
literature analysing the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on trade flows. In
this paper we focus on FTAs (also called European agreements) between the
European Union (EU-15) and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC-4,
i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania) and model their effects on trade flows
by treating the agreement variable as endogenous. Our theoretical framework is the
gravity model, and the econometric method used to isolate and eliminate the
potential endogeneity bias of the agreement variable is the fixed effect vector
decomposition (FEVD) technique. Our estimation results indicate a positive and
significant impact of \FTAs on trade flows. This finding is robust to the inclusion in
the sample of a group of control countries (specifically Belarus, the Russian
G. M. Caporale (&)
Centre for Empirical Finance, Brunel University, West London UB8 3PH, UK
e-mail: Guglielmo-Maria.Caporale@brunel.ac.uk
G. M. Caporale
CESifo, Munich, Germany
G. M. Caporale
DIW, Berlin, Germany
C. Rault
LEO, University of Orle´ans, UMR 6221, BEM (Bordeaux Management School), Orle´ans, France
C. Rault
EDHEC (Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales), Lille Cedex, France
R. Sova
CES, Sorbonne University, A.S.E and E.B.R.C, Paris, France
A. Sova
CES, Sorbonne University, E.B.R.C, Paris, France
123
Rev World Econ (2009) 145:189–206
DOI 10.1007/s10290-009-0011-8
Federation and the Ukraine) that did not sign an FTA. Besides, we show that trade
growth after the FTA agreement with the EU was signed exceeded trade growth of
the control group of countries, which did not become members.
Keywords Regionalisation  European integration  Panel data methods
JEL Classification F13  F15  C23
1 Introduction
Following the new wave of regionalisation in the 1980s, regional integration has
again been extensively investigated both in the theoretical and empirical literature.
Recent analyses are based on Viner’s (1950) framework but also include theoretical
ideas from the new trade theory and economic geography, being concerned with the
impact of integration on global welfare. The innovation compared to the first wave
studies consists in taking into account the dynamic effects of geographical size, non-
economic gains, industrial localisation, and economies of scale.
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) to 27 countries which was
proposed during the 1990s was unprecedented in terms of the number of countries
and the changes which were implied, hence representing a challenge for both EU
member countries and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). It was a
very important development for the future of the European continent. From a
political point of view, it ensured stability after the troubled years of the Cold War.
From an economic point of view, because of the size and the population of the
countries involved and the development gap relative to the EU, the transition
towards a market economy has not been without difficulties for the CEEC.
There exists already an extensive literature analysing the effects of regional free
trade agreements (FTAs) on trade flows and stressing the role of regionalisation.
However, the evidence is mixed. Most studies assume that the FTA formation (i.e.
the choice of partner countries) is exogenous, but some papers highlight the
potential endogeneity bias in estimating the effects of FTAs on trade volumes
(Magee 2003; Baier and Bergstrand 2004). Regional agreements require the assent
of two governments. According to Grossman and Helpman (1995) an FTA assumes
a relative balance in the potential trade between the partner countries.
In this paper we focus on association agreements between four Central and Eastern
European countries (CEEC-4, i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania) and
European Union member states (EU-15, i.e. Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Denmark,
the United Kingdom, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) in the context of EU enlargement towards the East,
taking into account the conditions under which countries agree on FTAs, and their
effects on trade. Our econometric analysis is based on the gravity model and tries to
determine the effects of association agreements on trade flows treating FTAs as
endogenous. We are particularly interested in whether such European agreements
have increased trade flows between their members and, if so, by how much. To
address these issues, we examine the bilateral trade volume introducing a dummy
190 G. M. Caporale et al.
123
variable which represents the association agreement. In addition, we investigate the
robustness of the association agreement variable in two different ways by considering
an extended sample of countries including three countries (Belarus, the Russian
Federation and the Ukraine) that did not sign an FTA with EU-15 and using different
estimations methods. Also, we compare the trade growth between the EU-15 and
CEEC-4 countries and the trade growth between the EU-15 and other countries which
did not have a trade agreement. Further, we use panel data techniques to isolate and
eliminate the potential endogeneity bias of the agreement variable.
The contribution of this paper is threefold:
(i) In contrast to previous studies we rely on an estimation method, i.e. the fixed
effect vector decomposition (FEVD), that enables us to isolate and eliminate
the potential endogeneity bias of the agreement variable, thereby obtaining
more robust results. The agreement variable is here treated as endogenous,
unlike in earlier studies.
(ii) The sample period has been extended and includes additional observations,
spanning the period 1987–2005.
(iii) We check the robustness of the effects of FTAs by also considering a group of
control countries (Belarus, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine) which did
not conclude an agreement with the EU; besides, we examine whether
bilateral trade between the CEEC-4 and EU-15 is higher than between the
EU-15 and this group of control countries.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In Sect. 2 we discuss briefly
European agreements and the issue of endogeneity in regional agreements. In Sect.
3 we outline the theoretical framework, i.e. the gravity model. In Sect. 4 we discuss
alternative econometric methods to estimate gravity models, whilst the empirical
analysis is presented in Sect. 5. Section 6 summarises the main findings and offers
some concluding remarks.
2 European agreements and the endogeneity issue
EU enlargement is not a new phenomenon, as the EU has already been enlarged
several times since its creation: the year 1973 marked the accession of Denmark, the
United Kingdom and Ireland; 1981, of Greece; 1986, of Spain and Portugal; 1995,
of Austria, Sweden and Finland. However, EU enlargement towards the East is
different both politically and economically, as it is the first time that countries
belonging to the old communist bloc have applied for EU membership, and on this
occasion integration has increased by as much as a third the EU population and
territory (and to a lesser extent its wealth).
The EU proposed two basic strategic objectives for enlargement. Firstly, the
creation of a Europe which guarantees peace, stability, democracy and respect of the
human rights of minorities. Secondly, the creation of an open and competitive
market able to improve the standard of living in the CEEC, gradually achieving real
convergence. As a first step, in the early 1990s all candidate countries signed
bilateral ‘‘European agreements’’ or ‘‘Association agreements’’ with the EU creating
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preferential trade relationships.1 These included a time schedule for trade
liberalisation between the signatories, with the EU agreeing to reduce barriers
more quickly than the CEEC. However, initially tariff and non-tariff barriers were
not dismantled for sensitive sectors such as agriculture and textiles.
The expansion of regionalism has spawned an extensive literature on the effects
of FTAs on trade flows and the choice of countries to form a preferential trade
agreement. This literature focuses on welfare-enhancing and political arguments to
explain association agreements. Since Viner (1950) most studies have analysed the
welfare gains or losses from FTAs for member countries. FTAs have a positive
impact on welfare if trade creation exceeds trade diversion. Factors accounting for
the probability that two countries sign a regional agreement can be divided in three
groups: (i) geography factors, (ii) intra-industry trade determinants, and (iii) inter-
industry trade determinants.2 In brief, two countries are more likely to sign an
agreement if they are closer geographically, similar in size and differ in terms of
factor endowment ratios:
(i) The net welfare gain is higher the closer the two countries are, because of trade
creation. Several studies (Frankel et al. 1996; Frankel and Wei 1998) include
geographical proximity in their analysis of an FTA formation. The rationale is
the existence of transport costs (Helpman and Krugman 1985), leading to the
concept of ‘‘natural trade partners’’ based on geographical distance.3 Krugman
(1991) shows that in the case of agreements between geographically close
countries trade creation is sizable (see also Wonnacott and Lutz 1989), but the
concept of ‘‘natural’’ partners has attracted criticism, on the grounds that
geographical proximity and initially high trade volumes do not necessarily
ensure trade creation after FTA formation (see Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996).
(ii) The larger and more similar in economic size the two countries signing a trade
agreement are, the higher the welfare gains from trade creation, which are
achieved by exploiting economies of scale in the presence of differentiated
products.
(iii) The greater the difference in endowment ratios between two countries, the
higher the potential welfare gains from trade creation reflecting traditional
comparative advantages.
Consequently, countries which sign a regional agreement tend to have similar
economic characteristics, which leads to trade creation and welfare gains.
Non-economic objectives can also be behind regional agreements.4 In particular,
better political decision-making, a guarantee of policy irreversibility, and bigger
negotiating power with third parties could also explain such agreements (especially
1 Hungary (1991), Poland (1991), Romania (1993), the Czech Republic (1993), Slovakia (1993),
Bulgaria (1993), Latvia (1995), Estonia (1995), Lithuania (1995) and Slovenia (1995).
2 See Baier and Bergstrand (2004).
3 These models emphasise the role of transport costs in maximising/minimising the welfare of countries
(proximity of/distance between partners implies low/high transport costs).
4 See Johnson (1965), Cooper and Massell (1965), Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Magee (2003) and Baier
and Bergstrand (2004).
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when the agreement takes the form of a customs union with a common exterior
tariff—see Schiff and Winters (1998). Also, democratic countries are more
interested in consumers’ welfare and more likely to sign agreements with other
democratic partners. Further, De Melo et al. (1993) showed that regional agreements
make the implementation of policies more effective owing to a dilution effect of
preferences: the lobby capacity of interest groups is lower in a regional as opposed
to a national framework. Finally, such agreements make domestic policy reforms
irreversible (Ferna´ndez and Portes 1998).
There exists already an extensive literature analysing the effects of regional free
trade agreements (FTAs) on trade flows and stressing the role of regionalisation. Rose
(2004) in his paper estimates the effect of multilateral trade agreements—the World
Trade Organization (WTO), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)—on
international trade. He uses a standard gravity model of bilateral trade and a large
panel data set. His findings reveal that there is little evidence that GATT/WTO
membership has a substantial positive effect on trade. The GSP and the regional trade
associations typically seem to have a much larger effect than the multilateral GATT/
WTO system indicating that trade at least doubles with membership.
The first empirical studies analysing the trade effects of an FTA included an FTA
dummy variable in a gravity model. Most of them treated FTA formation (choice of
partner countries) as exogenous. The evidence was mixed. For instance, some
studies found a significant impact of EC (European Community) agreements on
trade flows between members (Aitken 1973), whilst others concluded that this effect
was insignificant (Bergstrand 1985) or even negative (Frankel 1997). This
highlighted the potential endogeneity bias affecting the preferential agreement
variable, and subsequently a few studies tried to address the endogeneity issue by
considering the role of economic factors, democratic freedom, and transport costs in
the decision to conclude a regional agreement. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found
that pairs of countries that sign an agreement tend to share common economic
characteristics, which results in net trade creation and welfare growth. Magee
(2003) measured the effects of preferential agreements on trade volumes treating
FTAs as endogenous, estimating a system of simultaneous equations with 2SLS. He
found that it is likely that two countries will sign an agreement if they are closer
geographically, are similar in size and are both democracies.
Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) tried to test the robustness of the regional agreement
effect by using cross-section data. They concluded that its effect may be over- or
underestimated owing to the potential endogeneity of this variable. These findings
were confirmed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007), who pointed out that the regional
agreement variable is not exogenous and the estimation of a gravity model using
cross-section data for investigating the quantitative effect of this variable on trade
flows can be biased because of unobservable heterogeneity or/and omitted variables.
The bias resulting from not considering this variable as endogenous is an important
issue; it can be the consequence of omitted variables that can be correlated with the
regional agreement variable. Panel data (fixed effects) methods were shown to be
suitable to take endogeneity into account.
Given the theoretical and empirical literature presented above concerning the
FTA formation, we now focus on the specific conditions which determined the
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association of the CEEC-4 with the EU-15. The EU enlargement to include the
CEEC countries was one of the Nice Summit challenges. This enlargement has
contributed to overcoming the artificial division of Europe, and has finally given the
CEEC countries, which have always been part of Europe, a chance to participate in
the European project.
The collapse of the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) put an
end to trade on the basis of planned exchanges, and to major industrial projects and/or
cooperation contracts based on production complementarity without considering
demand and supply. It has led to major transformations with the introduction of a
market economy, reintegration of the CEEC into the European economy, and changes
in the geography of the EU. On their part, the Western European countries have
turned more towards the CEEC countries, a dynamic and accessible market. Both
trade reorientation and EU enlargement have led to the signing of association
agreements, the first step towards integration. In fact, the ultimate goal of the
agreements is the accession of these countries. Despite the similar framework and
structure of the agreements, allowance has been made for differences across
countries, especially in terms of free trade, financial cooperation and sectoral policies.
In conclusion, in the context of the EU enlargement, the economic and political
transition of the CEECs to a market economy and towards a democratic system and
the geographical proximity to the EU-15 core represent important factors that
determine the signing of association agreements. Even if the literature indicates the
importance of economic size in the FTA formation, in this case we can see the
existence of differences in factor endowment between the EU and the CEEC, which
can generate trade flows based on comparative advantage, and therefore increase the
wealth. As international trade is one of the factors driving economic growth, we are
interested in examining the effects on trade of FTAs between the CEEC-4 and the
EU-15.
3 Trade flow effects of FTAs: the gravity model
Our theoretical framework to examine the trade flows effects of FTAs (treating
association agreements as endogenous) is the gravity model,5 in which trade flows
from country i to country j are a function of the supply of the exporter country and
of the demand of the importer country and trade barriers. In other words, national
incomes of two countries, transport costs (transaction costs) and regional
agreements are the basic determinants of trade.
Initially inspired by Newton’s gravity law, gravity models have become essential
tools in the analysis of the effects of regional agreements on trade flows. The first
applications were rather intuitive, without great theoretical claims. These included
the contributions of Tinbergen (1962) and Po¨yho¨nen (1963). But these studies were
criticised for their lack of robust theoretical foundations. Subsequently, new
international trade theory provided theoretical justifications for these models in
5 The popularity of the gravity model is highlighted by Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) who consider it
‘‘the workhorse for empirical studies of regional integration’’.
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terms of increasing returns of scale, imperfect competition and geography (transport
costs).
Linnemann (1966) proposed a gravity model derived from a Walrasian, general
equilibrium model. He explained exports of country i to country j in terms of the
interaction of three factors: potential supply of exports of country i, potential
demand of imports from the country j and a factor representing trade barriers.
Potential export supply is a positive function of the exporting country’s income
level and can also be interpreted as a proxy for product variety. Potential import
demand is a positive function of the importing country’s income level. Barriers to
trade are a negative function of trade costs, transport costs, tariffs. The model takes
the following form:
Xij ¼ eb0 Yb1i Nb2i Yb3j Nb4j Db5ij e
P
k
ckPkij ð1Þ
where Y represents country income, N represents the population, D is the
geographical distance and Pk includes dummy variables. Anderson (1979),
Bergstrand (1985) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) provided further theoretical
justifications for this model.
This equation was extended by Bergstrand (1989) by including per capita
income, which is an indicator of demand sophistication (demand for luxury vs.
necessity goods):
Xij ¼ eb0 Yb1i
Yi
Ni
 b2
Y
b3
j
Yj
Nj
 b4
D
b5
ij e
P
k
ckPkij ð2Þ
where Xij represents exports of country i to country j, b0 is the intercept, Yi and Yj
are the GDP of country i and j, respectively, (Yi/Ni) and (Yj/Nj) stand for GDP per
capita of country i and j, respectively, Dij represents the geographical distance
between the economic centres of two partners, Pkij stands for other variables such as
common language and historical bonds.
4 Econometric issues
The regionalism issue was most frequently examined using a gravity model
including a dummy variable for regional agreements.6 Most studies estimating a
gravity model applied the ordinary least square (OLS) method to cross-section data.
Recently, several papers have argued that standard cross-section methods lead to
biased results because they do not account for heterogeneity. For instance, the
impact of historical, cultural and linguistic links on trade flows is difficult to
quantify. On the other hand, the potential sources of endogeneity bias in gravity
model estimations fall under three categories: omitted variables, simultaneity, and
measurement error (Wooldridge 2002).
6 Baldwin (1994), Frankel (1997), Soloaga and Winters (2001), Glick and Rose (2002), Rault, Sova, and
Sova (2007a, 2007b) and Carre`re (2006).
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Matyas (1997) points out that the cross-section approach is affected by
misspecification and suggests that the gravity model should be specified as a
‘‘three-way model’’ with exporter, importer and time effects (random or fixed ones).
Egger (2000) argues that panel data methods are the most appropriate for
disentangling time-invariant and country-specific effects. Egger and Pfaffermayr
(2003) underline that the omission of specific effects for country pairs can bias the
estimated coefficients. An alternative solution is to use an estimator to control
bilateral specific effects as in a fixed effect model (FEM) or in a random effect
model (REM). The advantage of the former is that it allows for unobserved or
misspecified factors that simultaneously explain the trade volume between two
countries and lead to unbiased and efficient results.7 The choice of the method
(FEM or REM) is determined by economic and econometric considerations. From
an economic point of view, there are unobservable time-invariant random variables,
difficult to be quantified, which may simultaneously influence some explanatory
variables and trade volume. From an econometric point of view, the inclusion of
fixed effects is preferable to random effects because the rejection of the null
assumption of no correlation between the unobservable characteristics and
explanatory variables is less plausible (Baier and Bergstrand 2007).
Another method which has gained considerable acceptance among economists
(Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004) is the Hausman–Taylor’s panel one incorporating
time-invariant variables correlated with bilateral specific effects (see for instance,
Hausman and Taylor (1981), Wooldridge (2002) and Hsiao (2003)). Plu¨mper and
Troeger (2004) have proposed a more efficient method called ‘‘the fixed effect
vector decomposition (FEVD)’’ to accommodate time-invariant variables. Using
Monte Carlo simulations they compared the performance of the FEVD method to
some other existing techniques, such as the fixed effects, or random effects, or
Hausman–Taylor method. Their results indicate that the most reliable technique for
small samples is FEVD if time-invariant variables and the other variables are
correlated with specific effects, which is likely to be the case in our study.
Consequently, we use this technique for the empirical analysis.
Next we provide more details of the alternative methods mentioned above, i.e.
random effect estimator (REM), fixed effect estimator (FEM) and fixed effect vector
decomposition (FEVD).
4.1 Within estimator and random estimator (FEM and REM)
In the presence of correlation of the unobserved characteristics with some of the
explanatory variables the random effect estimator leads to biased and inconsistent
estimates of the parameters. To eliminate this correlation it is possible to use a
traditional method called ‘‘within estimator or fixed effect estimator’’ which consists
in transforming the data into deviations from individual means. In this case, even if
there is correlation between unobserved characteristics and some explanatory
variables, the within estimator provides unbiased and consistent results.
The fixed effect model can be written as
7 Egger (2000, 2002).
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yit ¼
XK
k¼1
bkxitk þ ai þ uit;
t ¼ 1; 2; . . .; T ; k ¼ 1; 2; . . .; K regressors; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; N individuals; ð3Þ
where ai denotes individual effects fixed over time and uit is the disturbance term.
If we substract from (3) the average over time of (3) we obtain the fixed effects
transformation as:
yit  yi ¼
XK
k¼1
bkðxitk  xikÞ þ ðuit  uiÞ ð4Þ
In the fixed effect transformation, the unobserved effect, ai, disappears, which
yields unbiased and consistent results.
The random model has the same form as before,
Yit ¼ a^0 þ a^1xit1 þ a^2xit2 þ    þ a^kxitk þ ai þ uit ð5Þ
where an intercept is included so that the unobserved effect, a´i, has a zero mean.
Equation 5 becomes a random effect model when we assume that the unobserved
effect a´i is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable:
Covðxitk; aiÞ ¼ 0; t ¼ 1; 2; . . .; T; j ¼ 1; 2; . . .; k: ð6Þ
The Hausman v2-test consists in testing the null hypothesis of no correlation
between unobserved characteristics and some explanatory variables and allows us to
make a choice between random estimator and within estimator. The within estimator
has, however, two important limits: firstly, it may not estimate the time-invariant
variables that are eliminated by data transformation; secondly, the fixed effect
estimator ignores variations across individuals. The individual’s specificities can be
correlated or not with the explanatory variable. In traditional methods these
correlated variables are replaced with instrumental variables uncorrelated to
unobservable characteristics.
4.2 Fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD)
Plu¨mper and Troeger (2004) suggest an alternative to the estimation of time-
invariant variables in the presence of unit effects, namely the model discussed in
Hsiao (2003). It is known that unit fixed effects are a vector of the mean effect
of omitted variables, including the effect of time-invariant variables. It is
therefore possible to regress the unit effects on the time-invariant variables to
obtain approximate estimates for invariant variables. Plu¨mper and Troeger (2004)
propose a three-stage estimator, where the second stage only aims at the
identification of the unobserved parts of the unit effects, and then uses the
unexplained part to obtain unbiased pooled OLS (POLS) estimates of the time-
varying and time-invariant variables only in the third stage. The unit effect
vector is decomposed into two parts: a part explained by time-invariant
variables and an unexplainable part (the error term). The model proposed by
Plu¨mper and Troeger (2004) yields unbiased and consistent estimates of
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the effect of time-varying variable which are unbiased for time-invariant
variables if the unexplained part of unit effects is uncorrelated with time-
invariant variables.
This model has the robustness of fixed effect model and allows for the correlation
between the time-variant explanatory variables and the unobserved individual
effects. In brief, the fixed effect vector decomposition (FEVD) proposed by Plu¨mper
and Troeger (2004) involves the three following steps:
(i) Estimation of the unit fixed effects by the FEM excluding the time-invariant
explanatory variables;
(ii) Regression of the fixed effect vector on the time-invariant variables of the
original model (by OLS);
(iii) Re-estimation of the original model by POLS, including all time-variant
explanatory variables, time-invariant variables and the unexplained part of the
fixed effect vector. The third stage is required to control for multicollinearity
and to adjust the degrees of freedom.8
A general form of regression equation can be written as:
yit ¼ aþ bXit þ cZi þ eit ð7Þ
where bXit denotes the time-variant variable vector, cZi the time-invariant variable
vector and eit the normal distributed error component.
In the presence of unobserved time-invariant variables the Eq. 7 can be written as
yit ¼ aþ bXit þ cZi þ ui þ eit ð8Þ
where ui denotes the unobserved time-invariant variable whose unobserved effects
are a random variable rather than an estimated parameter.
The FEVD approach is implemented as follows:
4.2.1 First step
Recall the data generating process of Eq. 7. The within estimator quasi de-means the
data and removes the individual effects ui:
yit  yi ¼ bk
XK
k¼1
ðxkit  xkiÞ þ eit  ei  ~yit ¼ bk
XK
k¼1
~xki þ ~eit ð9Þ
The variance not used by the fixed effect estimator is most important.
The unit effects are explained by:
u^i ¼ yi  b^FEMk
XK
k¼1
xkit ¼ a^þ cj
XJ
j¼1
zji þ gi þ ^ei ð10Þ
8 The programme STATA proposed by the authors executes all three steps and adjusts the variance-
covariance matrix. Options like AR (1) error-correction and robust variance-covariance matrix are
allowed.
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where gi is the unexplained part of the unit effects and ei are the average unit means
of the FEM estimation (indicating panel heteroskedasticity if ei 6¼ 0Þ:
4.2.2 Second step
Given Eq. 10, it is simple to regress the u^i on the z-variables.
u^i ¼ xþ cj
XJ
j¼1
zji þ gi and g^i ¼ u^i  - cj
XJ
j¼1
zji ð11Þ
where x is the intercept of the stage 2 equation and gi is the unexplained part of the
unit effects as in Eq. 10. Equations 10 and 11 show that the exclusion of variables
that are simultaneously correlated with the unit-effects u^i and the time-invariant
variables zi lead to biased estimates. In other words, the estimates are unbiased only
if gi % 0 for all i or if E(zi | gi) = E(zi) = 0.
4.2.3 Third step
The full model is re-run without the unit effects but including the decomposed unit
fixed effect vectors comprising g^i obtained in step 2. The third step is estimated by
pooled OLS (or Prais–Winston in the presence of serial correlation).
yit ¼ aþ bk
XK
k¼1
xkit þ cj
XJ
j¼1
zji þ g^i þ eit ð12Þ
By construction, g^i is no longer correlated with the vector of the z’s.
By including the error term of step 2 it is possible to account for individual
specific effects that cannot be observed. The coefficient of g^i is either equal to 1.0 or
at least close to 1.0 (by accounting for serial correlation or panel heteroskedasticity)
in step 3. Estimating stage 3 by pooled OLS further requires that heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation must be eliminated beforehand.
At least in theory this method has three obvious advantages (Plu¨mper and
Troeger 2004): (i) the fixed effect vector decomposition does not require prior
knowledge of the correlation between time-variant explanatory variables and unit
specific effects, (ii) the estimator relies on the robustness of the within-
transformation and does not need to meet the orthogonality assumptions (for
time-variant variables) of random effects, and (iii) FEVD estimator maintains the
efficiency of POLS.
Essentially, FEVD produces unbiased estimates of time-varying variables,
regardless of whether they are correlated with unit effects or not, and unbiased
estimates of time-invariant variables that are not correlated. The estimated
coefficients of the time-invariable variables correlated with unit effects, however,
suffer from omitted variable bias. To summarise, FEVD produces less biased and
more efficient coefficients. The main advantages of FEVD come from its lack of
bias in estimating the coefficients of time-variant variables that are correlated with
unit-effects.
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5 Empirical analysis
5.1 The econometric strategy
The econometric model we adopt in order to identify and to quantify the impact of
the association agreement on trade flows between the EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries
was chosen taking into account our sample of data, the potential endogeneity of the
variables, the existence of unobservable bilateral characteristics which might or
might not be correlated with the explanatory variables, and multicollinearity.
Our econometric specification is the following:
logðYijtÞ ¼ a0 þ a1 logðGDPitÞ þ a2 logðGDPjtÞ þ a3 logðGDPCitÞ þ a4 logðGDPCjtÞ
þ a5 logðDistijÞ þ a6Stpit þ a7Llkij þ a8Accijt þ uij þ ht
þ eijtði ¼ 1; . . .N; t ¼ 1; . . .TÞ ð13Þ
In this specification, the average value of bilateral trade (Yijt) is the dependent
variable. The explanatory variables used are the gross domestic product of the two
partners (GDPit), (GDPjt), geographic distance (Distij), income per capita (GDPC,it
GDPCjt), political stability (Stp), landlocked countries (Llk) and the dichotomous
variable association agreement (Accijt).
The notation is the following:
• Yijt denotes the average value of bilateral trade between countries i and j at time t
with i = j (millions of dollars);
• ao is the intercept;
• GDPit, GDPjt represent the gross domestic product of country i and country j
(millions of dollars);
• GDPit/Nit, GDPjt/Njt are the GDP per capita of country i and country j;
• Distij represents the distance between country i and country j (kilometres);
• Accijt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if country i and country j have
concluded a regional agreement at time t, and zero otherwise;
• Stpijt is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if country has political stability
and zero otherwise;
• Llkij is a dummy variable representing the number of landlocked countries in the
country pair (0, 1 or 2);
• uij is a bilateral specific effect (i = 1,2,…,N, j = 1,2,…,M);
• ht is a time specific effect (t = 1,…,T);
• eijt is the disturbance term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with a
zero mean and a constant variance for all observations and to be uncorrelated.
To assess the robustness of our results on the effects of FTAs we include in our
sample a control group of countries, specifically Belarus, the Russian Federation
and the Ukraine, i.e. three countries, which belonged in the past to the Communist
bloc and have then introduced market reforms but did not sign an FTA with the EU.
More precisely, we test whether the association dummy is still significant if one
considers the period where all CEEC-4 have an Accijt dummy of 1 and where
additional countries that did not sign an FTA are added to the estimation sample
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with an Accijt dummy of 0. The Accijt dummy variable measures the impact of the
association agreement on trade between members. The estimated equation is the
same as (13) with the Accijt dummy now defined as explained above.
Another possible way of checking robustness is to make a comparison between
growth in trade between the EU and the countries that signed an FTA (i.e. the
CEEC-4) and some others that did not (here Belarus, the Russian Federation and the
Ukraine). For this purpose, we introduce in Eq. 14 two dummy variables.9 In this
case, the equation to be estimated writes as follows:
logðYijtÞ ¼ a0 þ a1 logðGDPitÞ þ a2 logðGDPjtÞ þ a3 logðGDPCitÞ þ a4 logðGDPCjtÞ
þ a5 logðDistijÞ þ a6Stpit þ a7Llkij þ a8Accijt þ Accnijt þ uij þ ht
þ eijtði ¼ 1; . . .N; t ¼ 1; . . .TÞ ð14Þ
where:
• Accijt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if country i and country j have
concluded a regional agreement at time t, and zero otherwise.
• Accnijt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if one country has a regional
agreement and its partner country does not at time t, and zero otherwise.
The first dummy variable measures the impact of the agreement on trade between
FTA’ members and the second one measures the trade effect between a member
country and another which is not.
The data source is the CHELEM—French CEPII data base for GDP and
population; the CEPII data base for geographic distance and Freedom House for
political stability. The estimation period goes from 1987 to 2005, i.e. 19 years for a
sample of EU-1510 and 4 CEEC countries11 for the first set of estimates. For the
second we have a sample from 1991 to 2005 owing to fewer observations being
available for the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. We construct a panel with two
dimensions: country pairs and years.
5.2 Estimation results
This section summarises the results from the estimation of the gravity model. We
used panel data techniques for eliminating the endogeneity bias, and applied
different panel data econometric methods such as fixed effect model (FEM), random
effect model (REM) and fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) in order to
check the robustness of our estimation technique and also of our results (see
Tables 1, 2).
Table 1 shows the impact of FTAs on bilateral trade between EU-15 and CEEC-4.
The aggregate estimation indicates a positive effect of the association agreement
9 Rose (2004) also compares trade patterns for countries in the GATT/WTO with those outside the
system using two dummy variables, one to measure the trade effect if both countries are GATT/WTO and
the other if one country is a member and the other is not.
10 EU-15: Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden.
11 Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania.
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variable on trade flows, in accordance with previous studies.12 This is a standard
result consistent with the theory of regional integration: membership of the FTA
facilitates trade exchanges between the partners. The coefficients are statistically
significant and have the expected signs consistent with the gravity model: a positive
effect on trade flows of country size, income per capita, political stability and
association agreement, and a negative impact of geographical distance. The effect of
the association agreement is positive and the estimated coefficient is 0.204 (see
column (3) of Table 1), which indicates that the agreement results in a 23%
increase13 in trade between the members. Thus, there is clear evidence that the
agreement has increased trade volume between the EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries.
We assessed the robustness of our results using data for a larger group of
countries (also including Belarus, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine) (see
column (3) of Table 2). Since the FEVD method produces more robust estimates in
what follows we focus on the FEDV estimates. All variables are still significant and
have the expected sign, including the FTA variable. We note that in all cases the
FTA variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on bilateral trade. This
result is robust to the use of different estimation techniques or different samples of
countries.
Table 1 The impact of the association agreement on bilateral trade between EU-15 and CEEC-4
Variables FEM REM FEVD
(1) (2) (3)
Yijt Yijt Yijt
GDPit 1.453 (3.45)*** 0.701 (5.52)*** 1.453 (3.44)***
GDPjt 1.107 (2.97)*** 0.977 (13.32)*** 1.107 (2.97)***
Distij 0.000 (.) -1.447 (8.07)*** -1.139 (2.57)**
GDPCit 0.660 (1.89)* 1.424 (8.03)*** 0.660 (2.64)**
GDPCjt 0.816 (2.03)** 0.881 (5.68)*** 0.816 (56.25)***
Llkij 0.000 (.) -0.191 (2.30)** -0.031 (1.83)*
Stpit 0.160 (11.07)*** 0.159 (11.79)*** 0.160 (6.06)***
Accijt 0.204 (12.10)*** 0.201 (12.29)*** 0.204 (18.57)***
Constant -17.626 (19.99)*** -12.101 (15.56)*** -13.993 (182.82)***
Observations 1,064 1,064 1,064
R-squared 0.82 0.87 0.96
Fischer Prob [ F 38.37 (0.00) – –
Hausman Prob [ v2 – 13.08 (0.04) –
As explained in the main text, the FEVD method is the preferred one, the others (FEM and REM) are
reported for comparison purposes and to check the robustness of the results to the estimation technique
used
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
12 See for instance, Soloaga and Winters (2001), Carre`re (2006), Rault et al. (2007a, b).
13 & exp (0.204)-1.
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We also made a comparison between trade between the EU and the countries that
signed an FTA (i.e. the CEEC-4) and some others that did not, and estimated for this
purpose Eq. 14 that includes two dummy variables. Our econometric results (see
Table 3) indicate that both dummies are significant at the 1% level, which suggests
that members countries are more inclined to trade amongst themselves than with
other countries which are not part of the association agreement. Moreover, the
estimated coefficients of the Accijt and Accnijt dummy variables are, respectively,
0.210 and 0.089, which highlights that countries which have signed an association
agreement trade 14.0%14 more than those without such an agreement (see Table 3).
As for robustness to using alternative estimation techniques, one can see that the
estimated coefficients are similar for FEM and FEVD; however, the latter not only
enables us to isolate the endogeneity of the association agreement variable and to
obtain unbiased coefficients, but also captures the effects of time-invariant variables
on trade flows.
The Fisher test suggests the introduction of effects (fixed or random) to improve
the estimation results. The estimated coefficients of the FEM are different from
those obtained with the REM (for instance, association agreement) which can be
explained by the existence of a correlation between some explanatory variables and
Table 2 The impact of the association agreement on bilateral trade using an extended sample of
countries, i.e. the CEEC-4 and additional countries which did not sign an FTA (Belarus, the Russian
Federation and the Ukraine)
Variables FEM REM FEVD
(1) (2) (3)
Yijt Yijt Yijt
GDPit 0.797 (3.44)*** 0.951 (17.56)*** 0.797 (7.25)***
GDPjt 5.248 (3.59)*** 0.944 (13.68)*** 5.248 (4.67)***
Distij 0.000 (.) -1.170 (7.15)*** -1.104 (6.48)***
GDPCit 0.693 (2.49)** 0.879 (12.34)*** 0.693 (2.56)**
GDPCjt 1.051 (2.03)** 2.929 (13.78)*** 1.051 (2.13)**
Llkij 0.000 (.) -0.085 (1.72)* -0.114 (3.03)***
Stpit 0.106 (3.11)*** 0.004 (1.71)* 0.106 (2.01)**
Accijt 0.164 (4.29)*** 0.297 (7.74)*** 0.164 (5.01)***
Constant -23.414 (15.44)*** -13.694 (13.20)*** -19.707 (124.16)***
Observations 1,470 1,470 1,470
R-squared 0.82 0.64 0.85
Fischer Prob [ F 13.80 (0.04) – –
Hausman Prob [ v2 – 230.23 (0.00) –
As explained in the main text, the FEVD method is the preferred one, the others (FEM and REM) are
reported for comparison purposes and to check the robustness of the results to the estimation technique
used
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%
14 & (exp (0.21)-1)- (exp(0.09)-1).
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the bilateral specific effect. Moreover, the Hausman test rejects the null assumption
of no correlation between the individual effects and some explanatory variables for
all estimations. This implies endogeneity bias, and therefore the fixed effects
model is preferred. The Davidson–MacKinnon test of exogeneity (F = 160.26,
P value = 0.00), confirm the endogeneity of the FTA. We also calculate the
variance inflation factor (VIF) to ensure that multicollinearity does not affect the
quality of estimates. In our all estimates, VIF did not exceed the threshold of 10,
indicating that there is no multicollinearity.15
Overall, the agreement variable coefficient indicates a positive and statistically
significant impact on bilateral trade in all cases.
6 Conclusions
This paper has analysed the impact of association agreements on trade flows
between the EU-15 and CEEC-4 countries treating the agreement variable as
endogenous and using appropriate panel methods to estimate a gravity equation.
The most relevant estimates are those provided by the FEVD estimation method,
which is the most appropriate for our purposes. This method permits to obtain
unbiased coefficients and to capture the effects of time-invariant variables. As
theory suggests, association agreements were found to have a positive and
significant impact on trade flows between the participant countries.
To check the robustness of the effects on trade of FTAs we have also included in
our sample a control group of countries (Belarus, the Russian Federation and the
Ukraine), i.e. three countries, which belonged in the past to the Communist bloc and
have then introduced market reforms but did not sign an FTA with the EU. It must
be emphasised that in all our estimations (conditional to other variables) the FTA
Table 3 The impact of the
association agreement on
bilateral trade using an extended
sample of countries including
the CEEC-4 and additional
countries which did not
conclude an FTA
Absolute value of t statistics in
parentheses
* Significant at 10%;
** Significant at 5%;
*** Significant at 1%
Variables FEVD
Yijt
GDPit 1.118 (24.82)***
GDPjt 6.937 (11.64)***
Distij -4.270 (62.67)***
GDPCit 1.209 (1.74)*
GDPCjt 3.421 (74.12)***
Llkij -0.189 (4.55)***
Stpit 0.057 (2.12)**
Accijt 0.210 (12.77)***
Accnijt 0.089 (3.54)***
Constant -8.770 (108.29)***
Observations 1,995
R-squared 0.84
15 A variance inflation factor value higher than 10 reveals the presence of multicollinearity requiring
specific corrections (Gujarati 1995).
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variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on bilateral trade regardless
of the estimation technique or sample of countries chosen, which provide evidence
of the robustness of our results.
A comparison of trade between the EU-15 and the countries that signed an FTA
(i.e. the CEEC-4) and some others that did not, specifically Belarus, the Russian
Federation and the Ukraine, using two dummy variables, suggest that countries with
an association agreement trade 14.0% more than the others, which do not have one.
This result is consistent with theory and the experience of these countries. Indeed, in
the case of the CEEC-4, following the FTA, within a few years the EU became their
main commercial partner. The relative weight of CEEC-4 trade with the EU-15 was
approximately 37% in 1990; 60% in 2000 and 74% in 2005, whereas for Belarus,
the Russian Federation and the Ukraine it was around 33% in 1992 and 38% in
2005, and it has remained low and almost constant since then.
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